Mischief on the Mekong

In late 2019, water levels in the Mekong River, the longest waterway in Southeast Asia, reached a 100-year low.¹ In some parts of Thailand and Laos, the mighty Mekong dried up altogether, despite above-average rainfall in the Tibetan Plateau where the river originates.² The answer to this contradiction lies upstream: before the Mekong River leaves China, its water flows through a series of 11 massive dams, which blocked water from flowing to the drought-stricken river delta. Taking China’s actions in the Mekong as a case study of its evolving peripheral diplomacy strategy, I argue that these dams signal China’s growing interest in regional hegemony in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, I contend that China attempts to balance dominance with the perception of benevolence when exercising this hegemony.

Concern over the Mekong river’s flow began in the early 1990s, when China began building its first dams, and has intensified since then as Beijing has shown no sign of slowing development.³ Critically, dams can choke off not only the supply of water, but also fish and nutrients that downstream communities rely on for their livelihoods. These resources are the backbone of Southeast Asian economies, which rely heavily on agriculture. For example, fisheries in the Lower Mekong River Basin (LMRB) contribute $17 billion of output a year to the region, representing three percent of regional GDP.⁴ Furthermore, the World Wildlife Fund estimates that “one-third of the 60 million people living in the LMRB have a primary occupation linked to the river.”⁵

Despite these dire consequences, China has both domestic and foreign policy motives for pursuing dam-building. At home, the dams serve as an important source of power generation: the 11 hydropower stations generate energy valued at over $4 billion every year.⁶ Developing a robust hydroelectric energy source on the Mekong also dovetails neatly with the party goal of clean energy development. Overseas, the dams offer China valuable leverage with which they can pressure Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam. Given the reliance of these states on the Mekong river for economic development, China can use these dams as a tool to extract concessions on issues such as fishing rights in the South China Sea and trade and infrastructure development. Trade is especially important for China, given that Southeast Asia is China’s largest source of imports and largest destination for exports in the developing world.⁷

Where, then, does Chinese dam-building on the Mekong fit in the broader picture of Beijing’s strategy in Southeast Asia? As Evelyn Goh notes, the United States remains the most important player in the region, but China has sought to challenge this status by changing the terms of the bargains that undergird Southeast Asian hegemony. One major arena in which hegemony is established, Goh points out, is international institutions, and China has taken the lead in this area with regard to the Mekong.⁸ Beijing refuses to join the Mekong River Commission, the largest international body regulating water usage in the region, and instead engages in diplomacy through the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, which it founded in 2014.⁹ This move aligns with the Chinese approach to institutions: building alternative fora for multilateral engagement where it can resist the influence of Western-dominated organizations.

Chinese dam-building can also be viewed through the lens of its increasingly aggressive peripheral strategy. Stephen Smith argues that since 2012, Xi Jinping’s regional foreign policy has evolved to become significantly more proactive, diverging from the mere engagement of the past.¹⁰ Dam-building certainly fits within this framework, as the recent spike in construction and the control of the river’s flow reinforces the asymmetric and hierarchical nature of the relationship between Beijing and its LMRB neighbors. Indeed, Smith draws a parallel between Confucian ideas of familial role and the relations of China with its subordinate states. His reference to tributaries seems especially fitting, given that Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam are rendered geopolitically downstream of China because they are geographically downstream on the Mekong.

Beyond the dams it builds within its territory, China has also invested heavily in the development of dams in neighboring Laos. Chinese companies are co-financing four out of the seven dams currently under construction in Laos, in addition to two that were already built with Chinese funding.¹¹ These investments, part of the Belt and Road Initiative, represent a concerted effort to expand regional economic integration while also expanding Chinese hegemony over the LMRB.¹² Given that the Chinese government often uses infrastructure investments as a pretense for geopolitical objectives (see, for instance, their military use of the Gwadar port in Pakistan), these dams offer the opportunity for micro-level water management at different points in the river’s flow.¹³

Still, China is acutely aware of the reputational risks that come with cutting off water, sediment, and fish flows. In response, it has embarked on a rigorous public relations campaign to recast its role on the Mekong to that of a well-intentioned leader. During a visit to Laos in February 2020, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed concerns over the river’s flow, instead contending that Beijing “overcome various difficulties to increase the water discharge.”¹⁴ The Chinese government also commissioned a study that identified beneficial effects of the 11 dams on water levels in the LMRB during the drought of 2019.¹⁵

These claims have some credence; it is unlikely that China will continue to cut off the Mekong’s flow for a prolonged period of time. After all, China is interested in the economic development of the Mekong delta insofar as it contributes positively to trade relations, and devastating the economy of the region would run counter to that goal. Further, aggressive actions on the Mekong would likely spark retaliation after reaching a certain threshold. While the LMRB states are currently aligned with the United States, many are pivoting gradually towards China and hope to avoid choosing sides in the growing great power conflict. Since most East Asian states do not view China as a serious threat to their survival, they are reluctant to anger Beijing, but cutting off the Mekong may cross that line for Laos and Thailand in particular.¹⁶

China is already reluctant to engage in coercion, especially in regions where it has a vested economic interest. Even when it does perform coercive measures, this activity tends to be nonmilitary, suggesting a preference towards benevolence rather than heavy-handed relations with its neighbors.¹⁷ China’s efforts to “harmonize its periphery,” then, rely on a tacit bidirectional agreement: given that states respect China’s core interests, they will receive concrete material benefits, in this case water access.¹⁸ While the damming of the Mekong river expands China’s ability to punish states for noncompliance with this compact, it remains unlikely that China will actually exact punishment. 

The Mekong river is the lifeline of Southeast Asia, and China’s dams represent potential peril for the region. For China, however, the next challenge will be managing these dams to strategically grow its hegemony while remaining a trusted partner for LMRB states.